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Introduction
The  world  of human  emotions  and  its  diversity  have  since  the  times 
immemorial  challenged  a number  of disciplines  that  deal  with  interpersonal 
communication: psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, cultural studies, 
anthropology, linguistics and even so distant branches as economics, criminology, 
political science or law. The complex nature of emotions makes it practically 
impossible to study this phenomenon exclusively from one angle - relying on 
one method of analysis (e.g. psychological or linguistic) may prove insufficient 
for giving a complete account of the numerous problems arising.
The present paper aims at presenting how emotions may be viewed from 
linguistic  perspective,  focusing  especially  on  terminological  and  ontological 
difficulties linked to the subject of emotions, and on the specific areas of research 
undertaken by contemporary linguistics.
Towards the definition of emotions
The broad use of the notion of emotions in many scientific disciplines 
makes  it  difficult  to  define  it  both  clearly  and  disambiguously.  The 
problem with working out a common definition stems from the complexity 
of this  phenomenon  on the  one  hand,  and the  attempt to  embrace  it  in  a 
comprehensive  way  on  the  other.  Moreover,  different  disciplines  tend to 
focus their attention to  different  aspects  of emotions,  and the  differences 
concerning  the  same  issue  evolve  over  decades  and  approaches  to  the 
problem.
Among  different  attempts  to  define  the  phenomenon  of  emotion, 
stretching back at least as far as ancient Greek stoics,  Plato and Aristotle, 
the most mainstream definition may be phrased after Kleigninna and Kleigninna
287(1981:355)'  as a complex set of interactions among subjective  and objective 
factors, motivated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective 
experiences  such  as  feelings  of arousal  pleasure/displeasure;  (b)  generate 
cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, 
labeling processes;  (c)  activate  widespread physiological adjustments  to  the 
arousing conditions;  and (d)  lead to  behaviour that is  often,  but not always, 
expressive,  goal-directed,  and adaptive.  In  short,  emotion would be  a  set  of 
changes including psychological arousal, affection, cognitive processes and an 
outward expression of behaviour, which occurs when an individual experiences 
a  certain  situation.  The  question  of how  these  psychological,  cognitive  and 
behavioural phenomena coexist and influence each other in a human experience of 
emotions, has been subject to various theoretical treatments (see e.g. Kleigninna 
and Kleigninna 1981, Gerrig and Zimbardo 2002). Their detailed account, due to 
the psychological rather than linguistic nature, exceeds the scope of this paper; 
however,  as hinted in the foregoing, one  should be aware that much of those 
findings may prove to provide useful background for linguistic research.
Etymologically, the English word emotion is derived from the French word 
émouvoir, based on the Latin emovere, where e- (variant of ex-) means “out” 
and movere  means  “move”  (see  Skeat  1963:193).  In common understanding, 
the term emotion is often identified with feeling. However, as Pettinelli (2009) 
notices,  despite the  fact that both  can be  described as  unconscious  thoughts, 
they  pertain  to  different  phenomena.  Feeling,  being  immediate  and  easy  to 
identify, would be close to sensation, whereas emotion is a more unconscious 
and deeper experience, which affects more of us, because it is mixed into the 
rest of our mental system. Moreover, feelings can be described in more detail 
than emotions because you can have a specific feeling for anything, each feeling 
is unique and might not have a name (see Pettinelli 2009). As a result, there are 
only a few defined emotions, but an infinite number of ways of feeling things.
The  distinction  between  feelings  and  emotions  has  also  been  discussed 
by Wierzbicka (1992,  1995), who strongly opposes to using the term emotion 
as  a universal  and  common measure  of all  languages,  because  this  leads  to 
confusion,  chaos, and distortion of reality (see Wierzbicka 1995:17).2 Bom out 
of the distinction between emotions (mental phenomena) and sensations (bodily
1   Kleigninna and Kleigninna (1981) analysed 92  definitions of emotion from a variety of 
sources in the literature of the subject,  evaluated and classified them into different categories, 
and proposed their own model definition, which aims at emphasizing the many possible and tra­
ditionally  significant aspects of emotion and, therefore,  attempts to resolve the terminological 
confusion.
2 Wierzbicka (1992:177-179) suggests that a truly  fundamental human concept is feeling-a 
far more universal term that could be safely used in the investigation of human nature, as opposed 
to the more elaborated, culture-bound, and not fully reliable, emotion.
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English language and in  the ethnopsychology embodied in it and which have 
become taken over by the language of  the scholarship as one of  its basic concepts 
(see Wierzbicka 1992:178). In fact, the term in question does not have exact (or 
even inexact) equivalents in many other natural languages of the world,  so in 
practice it refers to the English-speaking culture only and presents the reality from 
this particular perspective, as the author claims. Further, Wierzbicka (1995:17) 
argues that we are imprisoned in our respective  languages and cultures,  and, 
hence, no neutral or culture independent perspective is possible. This dependence 
should  be  borne  in  mind  when  undertaking  any  research  on  this  subject.
How to give emotion a name
Challenging as it is, defining the concept of emotion cannot even compare 
to  the  extremely  difficult  task  of putting  particular  types  of emotions  into 
words.  Any  attempt to  do  it  must  reconcile  with the  fact that  emotions  are 
actually undefinable  and not fully possible to  be  expressed in words, just as 
experiences and emotional cognition (cf. Scheler 1916:62, Wierzbicka 1971:30, 
Nowakowska-Kempna 2000:75). What  is  more,  since  emotions  refer to  very 
subtle states of human mind and consciousness, their semantic structure is much 
more  difficult to be  formalized and expressed by means  of words than other 
mental states. Another difficulty is posed by the fact that emotions may arise 
from subjective interpretation, which results in different emotions being named 
with the  same word, or the same emotion - with different words.  Bearing all 
these  difficulties in mind, one may be tempted to try applying the method of 
explaining particular emotions through other words. However, this may hardly 
prove successful, as ifone attempts to define one emotion word via others, one will 
never be able to elucitade the meaning of  any of  them (see Wierzbicka 1992:121).
Even more  serious  problems  arise  when  attempting to translate  emotion 
words from one language into another. In this context, a solution suggested by 
Wierzbicka (1992) is to decompose emotion terms into simpler concepts, such as 
‘want', ‘feel', ‘think', ‘say', or ‘do', which are held to be elementary values into 
which the sense of words may be decomposed. In this way emotion terms from a 
particular language may become meaningful to speakers of other languages. One 
of the examples given by the author is expressing the Polish words tesknota and 
tesknic, which do not have exact counterparts in English, by their decomposition 
into elementary parts which have simple English equivalents, i.e.:
A' tqskni do Y — > ■
Xfeels something like this:
I am away  from Y.
When I was with Y I  felt something good.
289I want to be with Y now.
If  I were with Y now I would  feel something good.
I cannot be with Y now.
Because of this, A'feels something bad.3
In this way, the meaning of any emotion word, often unique to a particular 
language and with no exact equivalents in other languages, could be presented 
much more effectively, retaining all subtle nuances of meaning content.
Typology of emotions
The range of emotion types is vast and heterogenous, as proved for example 
by the study of Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989), who gathered emotion words 
listed  in  different  dictionaries  and  arrived  at total  number  of 590  items.  To 
take any odd example, the collection of words related to the concept of FEAR 
includes  nearly  20  lexical  items,  i.e.:  fear,  afraid,  scared,  fright,  frightened, 
terrified, petrified,  horrified,  dread,  alarmed, panic,  anguish,  anxiety,  worried, 
concerned,  apprehension, shame,  embarrassment (cf. Wierzbicka 1986,  1988). 
In an attempt to get to grips with this mass of words and underlying emotions, a 
number of taxonomies have been proposed, e.g.:
1.  cognitive versus non-cognitive emotions,
2.  instinctual versus cognitive emotions,
3.  short-lasting versus long-lasting emotions,
4.  positive versus negative emotions.4
Both philosophers and psychologists have long been trying to distinguish 
between essential and more marginal emotion terms, and thus to set up a system 
of basic emotions. "Basic” would mean these emotions which occupy a middle 
level in a vertical hierarchy of concepts (see Kovecses 2000:3), or appear to be 
more  "prototypical” than others.  For example, Ribot (1912) distinguished the 
following types:  (1) fear,  (2)  anger,  (3)  love,  (4)  sexual feelings,  (5) egoistic 
feelings; Watson (1924) - three inborn emotions:  (1) fear,  (2) anger, (3) love; 
Ekman (1982) - six core emotions:  (1) anger, (2) disgust, (3) fear, (4) joy, (5) 
sadness, (6) surprise. Moreover, quite influential has been Plutchik's (1980) wheel 
of emotions, where eight primary bipolar emotions are suggested: (1) joy versus 
(2) sadness; (3) anger versus (4) fear; (5) trust versus (6) disgust; and (7) surprise
3 Taken from Wierzbicka (1992:121).
4 The last division is rejected by some psychologists (see e.g. Izard 1977), who claim that 
emotion as such cannot be positively or negatively loaded, but it is “shaped” by its experiencer. 
A crucial factor here may also be cultural differences.
290versus  (8)  anticipation;  and  Parrot's  (2001)  categorized,  tree-structured  list 
divided into primary, secondary and tertiary emotions. Among those and a number 
of other classifications, the most frequently held core emotions are HAPPINESS, 
SURPRISE,  SADNESS, ANGER,  DISGUST,  CONTEMPT,  and  FEAR  (see 
Izard and Malatesta 1987), and the thousands of other related emotion words are 
seen as their synonyms. All in all, the core emotions are believed to be biologically 
determined emotional responses whose expression and recognition is the same 
for all individuals, regardless of ethnic or cultural differences (see Beck 2004).
In  linguistics,  a  similar  approach  was  pursued  by  Johnson-Laird  and 
Oatley (1989), whose hypothesis was that certain emotion terms are basic and 
unanalysable  in the  sense that they cannot be  broken  down into  other,  more 
basic emotions or attributes  (a view also  supported by Langacker  1987:149). 
This means that basic emotion categories like JOY or ANGER will normally 
be  used  as points  of reference  to  describe  non-basic  ones  like  EUPHORIA, 
FURY,  EXUBERANCE  or  RAGE,  and  not  vice  versa.  For  the  English 
language,  extensive  research on this  subject has  been  carried  out by,  among 
others,  Fehr  and  Russell  (1984)  or  Shaver et al.  (1987);  a growing  number 
of studies  have  also  been  conducted  in  the  area  of other natural  languages 
(e.g.  Frijda et al.  1995;  Smith  and Tkel-Sbal  1995;  Smith  and  Smith  1995).
The  idea  of core  emotions  is  opposed  by  Wierzbicka  (1992:119),  who 
pointed to the fact that the emotions which have been called ‘universal' can only 
be treated so by the speakers of English.  Speakers of other languages may not 
be able to find equivalents for them in their own languages,  so they probably 
would not identify  some  of them  as  ‘basic' emotion terms.  The  author again 
emphasizes that English terms of emotions constitute a folk taxonomy,  not an 
objective,  culture-free analytical framework (see Wierzbicka  1992:119),  so  it 
must not be assumed that English emotion terms (e,g. disgust,  fear or shame) 
may be clues to universal human concepts or to basic psychological realities. 
And again, along the lines of her research, Wierzbicka suggests using language- 
independent semantic  metalanguage  to  talk  about  human  emotion  types,  as 
well as taking into consideration the findings of other branches of science to 
any linguistic research on emotions. The discussion may be concluded by the 
claim  made  by  Solomon  (1984:249-250)  who  says  that  while  it  is possible 
that some  emotions  may be  specific  to  all languages,  this should remain  an 
open  question  for  cross-cultural  inquiry,  not  an  a priori  supposition.5   The 
question of whether any universal, ‘‘pan-human” or ‘‘prototype” emotions exist 
remains open to further research of psychology, anthropology and linguistics.
5 Quoted after Wierzbicka (1992:175).
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The reservations to the accuracy of using certain emotion terms in different 
cultures,  as  already  illustrated  with the  example  of the  Polish  emotion term 
tesknic,  claimed to  have  no  exact  counterparts  in  English6,  may  lead to  the 
following, general question: If  an emotion term available in LI does not have an 
exact equivalent in L2, does it mean that the speakers of  L2 do not experience 
the  emotion  in  question? Wierzbicka (1992:124) gives the  following  answer:
Possibly,  all emotions can be,  better or worse,  expressed and described in words -  in any 
human language. But each language has its own set of ready-made emotion words, designating 
those emotions that the members of  a given culture recognize as particularly salient. Presumably, 
these language-specific sets overlap and, presumably, the closer two cultures are, the greater the 
overlap between their respective sets of emotion words.
This proves how close language is linked to cultural models of emotions, 
that  is  how  different  cultures  take  different  attitudes to  emotions,  which,  in 
turn, influences the people's use of language.  For example, the Polish culture 
values uninhibited emotional expression (see Wierzbicka 1991:121), which may 
be illustrated by numerous hypocoristic forms of personal names and terms of 
endearment. In the Jewish culture good and bad feelings are expressed by means of 
good and bad wishes, whereas the Japanese language reflects the culture based on 
indebtedness, empathy and anticipating what other people might feel. All of  these 
conditionings are visible inlinguisticexpressions ofemotions inparticular  cultures.7
Emotions in linguistic study today
The  linguistic  interest  in  emotions  came  along  with  the  development 
of cognitive  linguistics.  Before  that,  for traditional  semantics  framed  within 
structuralism, emotional meaning was of  minor importance and, as a phenomenon 
of connotative  rather that  denotative  nature,  achieved a somewhat peripheral 
status (see Lyons 1995:44). However, the linguistic discussions on the language 
of emotions acquired a new shape due to the development of  the cognitive theory, 
the central claim of which is that human conceptualization of reality mirrors our 
physical experience with all its bodily and physiological limitations, which, in
6 Wierzbicka (1992:121) claims that none of the related English words (i.e. homesick, nos­
talgia, to long, to miss, to pine) conveys the meaning of Polish tesknic sufficiently.
7 On this issue, see Kovecses (2000).
292turn,  is  reflected in language  (see Lakoff and Johnson  1980, Johnson  1987).8  
Another impulse to more intensive research on emotions came from the area of 
pragmatics, especially from the idea of  sociocognition (see Fiske and Taylor 1991, 
van Dijk 1995), and the emphasis put on the dependence of cognitive processes 
on affective and motivational factors and on social experience (see Danes 1994).
The contemporary investigation into the  reciprocal relationships between 
language  and emotive factor comes down to two basic areas  of research:  the 
first  pertains  to  the  ways  people  talk  about  emotions  and  the  information 
language  can  give  us  about  human  experience  and  conceptualization  of 
emotions, and, secondly, it addresses the question of the ways people  express 
emotions  in language  in a variety of situational,  social  and cultural contexts.
The area of linguistic investigation labelled emotional language or language 
of emotions  is by all means very broad and embraces the  following groups9: 
Expressive  emotion  words  -  used  in  order  to  express  emotions 
(exclamations, insulting words, etc.);
Descriptive emotion words - used in order to talk about emotions, that is: 
lexical items used for naming emotions and psychological states (e.g. love, 
hate, anger, depressed, sad) ;
lexical items used for expressing emotional assessment (e.g. beautiful, evil) 
lexical items which have emotional tinge by linguistic means (e.g. Johnny, 
sweetheart)',
lexical items in which the emotive factor dominates over meaning, either 
permanently, regardless of the context and situation, or becoming "emotional" 
only in particular contexts  (e.g.  animal terms used negatively with regard to 
people, such as pig, donkey, bitch)',
1.  Figurative  expressions - used in order to  denote  various  aspects  of 
emotion concepts, such as their intensity, cause, control, etc.
The  latter  group  deserves  special  attention  because  of  its  internal 
complexity.  Here,  one  may  count  metaphorical  expressions,  based  on 
conceptual  metaphors  with  physical  or physiological  source  domains  (e.g. 
boiling with anger -  a linguistic example of the conceptual metaphor ANGER 
IS A HOT FLUID, burning with love - an example of LOVE IS FIRE, to be
8 This idea was investigated in a number of further studies, see e.g. Taylor and MacLaury 
(1995), Niemeier and Dirven (1997), Athanasiadou and Tabakowska (1998), Wierzbicka (1999),
9 The following division into three main groups of emotive language is taken from Kovecses 
(1995a: 3), whereas the subdivision of the descriptive emotion words group follows Spaginska- 
Praszak (1994:10-11).
293on cloud nine - an example of HAPPINESS IS UP (Kovecses 2002:4-5, see 
also Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Kovecses  1987, Kovecses  1986,  1990,  1991), 
and  metonymical  expressions,  which  involve  a  single  domain  or  concept 
and are based on pragmatic functions from term to target, with the purpose of 
providing mental access to a domain through a part of the  same domain (or 
vice versa) or to one part of a domain through another part within the same 
domain (see Kovecses and Radden 1998).
Comparative studies on emotion
It is claimed that people are likely to use metaphors when describing emotion 
of different sorts, as they have the potential to evoke vivid accounts that tap into 
actual physical experience, such as the experience of  emotion (see Ortony et al. 
1988).  In fact, a lot of metaphors are built on physical experience {to explode, 
to let off  steam,  to get cold feet,  to have a cold sweat break out) or spatial terms 
(feeling up or down)1 ".
The  contemporary  cognitive  theory  of  metaphor  regards  metaphors 
as  playing  an  important  role  in  the  folk  and  scientific  conceptualization  of 
emotions.  The  conventionalized  language  used  for  talking  about  emotions 
is  viewed  as  an  important  tool  in  discovering  the  structure  of  emotion 
concepts  (see Kovecses  1990). The primary question that arises is the one of 
whether emotions  are  conceptualized in a similar way in  different languages 
and  whether  it  would  be justified to  claim  that  human  conceptualization  of 
emotions is universal.  In recent years, more  and more  researchers have been 
dealing with this problem, and a growing number of comparative studies have 
appeared for different languages in which English is contrasted with Chinese 
(King  1989),  Japanese  (Matsuki  1995),  Hungarian  (Kovecses  1995b),  Polish 
(Mikolajczuk  2003),  Wolof  language  (1991),  etc.  Apart  from  looking  for 
similarities and differences in the language of emotions and underlying emotion 
concepts,  an  important  question  these  studies  target  is  whether  conceptual 
metaphors  shape,  or just  reflect  cultural  models  associated  with  emotions.
Conclusion
The cognitive framework seems to  comply with the need of interdisciplinary  outlook on 
the  issue  of emotions,  as  it  itself draws upon  findings  of psychological,  anthropological  and 
philosophical  research.  Along  with  undertaking  further  studies  on  the  conceptualization  of
10 See e.g. Kovecses (1986, 1988, 1990, 1991), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson  (1980), 
Lakoff and Kovecses (1987).
294emotions in different languages, from the detailed analysis of the repertoire of linguistic means 
used for talking about emotions to investigation into tendencies to use metaphors or metonymies to 
talk about emotions, some broader conclusions could be drawn. The greatest challenge seems to be 
establishing whether there are any cultural (social, economical, conventional, political, religious) 
conditions  that  may  influence  the  relevant  changes  in  conceptualizing  emotions  in  different 
languages and whether it is possible to point to any laws or regularities that would govern these 
changes.
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